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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT
CASES: SHOULD COURTS APPLY A REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM AFTER
eBAY INC. v. MERCEXCHANGE, L.L.C.?

INTRODUCTION
A patent grants to its owner the right to “exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the [patented] invention” for a limited period
of time.1 Courts are permitted to grant injunctions to enforce this right to
exclude,2 and until recently, the Federal Circuit3 nearly always permanently
enjoined an infringer once patent validity and infringement had been adjudged,
absent exceptional circumstances.4
But in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that a permanent injunction should
automatically be granted in response to a finding of infringement.5 Instead, the

1. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). Under current law, the term of a utility patent is twenty
years from the date on which the patent application was filed. § 154(a)(2).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 283.
3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 in
response to a lack of uniformity in the application of the patent laws by the courts, rampant forum
shopping in patent litigation, and a high invalidity rate for patents involved in litigation. Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982); UNITED STATES
JUDICIAL CONF. COMM., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT:
A HISTORY 7–11 (1991). The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases, as well
as over cases in several other areas of law. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000); UNITED STATES JUDICIAL
CONF. COMM., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A
HISTORY, supra, at 225–26.
4. E.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989); W.L. Gore
& Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In fact, this practice
significantly predates the Federal Circuit. See Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive Relief in Patent
Infringement Suits, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1041–42 (1964) (noting that by the mid-nineteenth
century, a permanent injunction was considered to be the only remedy adequate to protect a
patent owner’s right to exclude, and thus courts often granted injunctive relief “as a matter of
course”).
5. 547 U.S. 388, 393–99 (2006); see MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (restating the general rule but recognizing that in rare instances, courts have
exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in order to protect the public interest, and that a
court may decline to enter an injunction where “a patentee’s failure to practice the patented
invention frustrates an important public need for the invention, such as the need to use an
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Court held that the general equitable principles governing the grant of
permanent injunctions apply with equal force to patent disputes.6 Specifically,
the Court held that a patentee seeking a permanent injunction must establish
that: (1) it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of
hardships between the patentee and the adjudicated infringer, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.7 Since eBay, district courts have declined to enter
permanent injunctions in at least seven cases, including the remand of the eBay
case itself, and as a consequence have in effect granted compulsory licenses to
the infringer.8
Although all eight of the Justices who took part in the opinion9 agreed that
the general equitable principles that govern the grant of injunctive relief in
other areas of the law should also apply in patent infringement cases, the
Court’s succinct decision left many questions unanswered. This Note focuses
on one of these questions: In the wake of the eBay decision, should courts
apply a presumption that the patentee will be irreparably harmed in the absence
of injunctive relief?
Prior to eBay, in the context of preliminary injunctions, the courts
consistently held that irreparable harm to the patentee would be presumed if
the patentee could demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits.10 It is not clear whether this presumption will continue to apply in the
context of preliminary injunctions and whether it will now also apply in the
context of permanent injunctions.11

invention to protect public health” (internal quotation marks omitted)), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1837
(2006).
6. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
7. Id.
8. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 591 (E.D. Va. 2007); Praxair,
Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007); Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte
Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007); Voda v. Cordis
Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *5–6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006); Paice LLC v.
Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006);
Final Judgment, Finisar Corp. v. The DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264 (E.D. Tex. July 7,
2006); z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
9. Justice Alito did not participate. Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court’s Helm, But He
Isn’t Yet in Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at A1.
10. E.g., Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Smith Int’l
v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
11. Prior to eBay, there was no need for courts to consider whether the presumption of
irreparable harm applied in the context of permanent injunctions, since the Federal Circuit simply
applied the “general rule” that an injunction would issue absent exceptional circumstances.
Mitchell G. Stockwell, Implementing eBay: New Problems in Guiding Judicial Discretion and
Enforcing Patent Rights, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 747, 749 (2006).
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Since eBay, some district courts have held that there is still a presumption
of irreparable harm in the preliminary injunction context,12 but others have
rejected this notion.13 The Federal Circuit has not yet issued a definitive ruling
on this issue. Likewise, although several district courts have rejected the
presumption in the permanent injunction context in light of eBay,14 the Federal
Circuit has thus far been silent on this issue as well.
How this issue is resolved will be critical to implementing the eBay
decision in a way that best effectuates the policies underlying the patent
system. The paramount goals of the patent system are to create incentives to
invent and incentives to disclose new inventions to the public.15 The patent
system also creates incentives for inventors to commercialize their inventions,
either through their own efforts or by licensing or assigning their patent rights
to others.16 Finally, the patent system provides incentives for others to “design
around” patents and invent non-infringing substitutes for patented inventions.17
The Federal Circuit has recognized that the availability of injunctive relief
is critical to maintaining these incentives. For instance, in Smith International,
Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., the court asserted that “[w]ithout the right to obtain an
injunction, the right to exclude granted to the patentee would have only a
fraction of the value it was intended to have, and would no longer be as great
an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and technological research.”18
Thus, the eBay decision should be implemented in a manner which ensures
that injunctive relief will continue to be widely available in most patent
infringement cases. This Note argues that eBay should be read as preserving a
rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit

12. E.g., Pass & Seymour, Inc. v. Hubbell Inc., No. 5:07-CV-0272, 2007 WL 2172648, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007); Christiana Indus. v. Empire Elecs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 870, 884
(E.D. Mich. 2006) (holding that the eBay decision did not invalidate the presumption of
irreparable harm).
13. E.g., Sun Optics v. FGX Int’l, No. 07-137-SLR, 2007 WL 2228569, at *1 (D. Del. Aug.
2, 2007) (stating that a presumption of irreparable harm “seems inconsistent” with the Supreme
Court’s holding in eBay); Torpso Hockey Int’l v. Kor Hockey Ltd., 491 F. Supp. 2d 871, 881 (D.
Minn. 2007) (holding that in light of eBay, the court may not presume that a patentee who is
likely to succeed on the merits at trial will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary
injunction); The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1017751, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2007) (stating that eBay “limit[s]” the presumption of irreparable harm).
14. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept.
5, 2006); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006); z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440
(E.D. Tex. 2006).
15. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 66–
68 (3d ed. 2004).
16. Id. at 68–71.
17. Id. at 71.
18. 718 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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should establish clear guidelines as to which factors (e.g., willfulness, whether
the patent owner licenses its invention to others, and/or whether the invention
at issue is a small and insignificant component of a multi-component
invention) should be considered when determining whether to grant a
permanent injunction.
This Note outlines several arguments for reading the eBay decision as
preserving a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm. First, language in the
concurrences of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy suggests that a
majority of the Justices would not find the application of such a presumption
objectionable. Second, as several district courts have recognized since eBay,
applying a presumption of irreparable harm makes sense because it would
preserve the fundamental nature of the patent grant as a right to exclude.19
Third, presuming irreparable harm would promote predictability as to whether
injunctive relief will be available and would thereby preserve the bargaining
power of the patentee, at least with respect to a significant subset of patent
infringement cases. At the same time, applying a presumption of irreparable
harm would not be tantamount to reinstating a “general rule” in favor of
injunctive relief. On the contrary, the presumption would be rebuttable, and
the irreparable harm factor could be outweighed by one or more of the other
equitable factors in some circumstances.
Part I of this Note first outlines the remedies that are available to patent
owners in patent infringement suits. Part I then explores the constitutional and
statutory bases for granting injunctive relief in patent infringement cases, and
provides a brief history of the standards the courts have applied in granting
such relief. Part I concludes with a discussion of two related issues—“patent
trolls” and the “patent holdup” problem—which have recently been the subject
of much debate and which likely influenced the Supreme Court’s decision in
eBay. Part II of this Note summarizes the district court, Federal Circuit, and
Supreme Court decisions in the eBay case, as well as the district court’s
decision on remand. Part III of this Note argues that the courts should apply a
rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm in determining whether to grant
injunctive relief and that the Federal Circuit should develop clear guidelines
with respect to the circumstances district courts should consider in determining

19. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000); Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d
317, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Because the principal value of a patent is its statutory right to
exclude, the nature of the patent grant weighs against holding that monetary damages will always
suffice to make the patentee whole.” (quoting Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446,
1456–57 (Fed. Cir. 1988))); Telequip Corp. v. The Change Exchange, No. 5:01-CV-1748, 2006
WL 2385425, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006) (“[M]onetary damages are not an adequate remedy
against future infringement because the principal value of a patent is its statutory right to
exclude.”).
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whether this presumption has been rebutted or outweighed by one or more of
the other equitable factors.
I. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES
A.

Remedies in Patent Infringement Cases

The remedies available for patent infringement can be divided into two
broad categories: (1) those which compensate the patent owner for past
infringement, and (2) those designed to prevent future infringement.20
In the first category are money damages and interest.21 The Patent Act
provides that upon finding for the patentee, the court “shall award . . . damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty . . . .”22 Thus, damages are measured either as profits lost as
a result of the infringing activity or as a reasonable royalty.23 To recover lost
profits, the patentee must show a reasonable probability that but for the
infringement, it would have made additional profits.24 If the patentee is unable
to prove that it lost profits as a result of an infringer’s actions, the patentee may
recover a reasonable royalty.25 Patentees generally prefer lost profits as a
measure of damages, since lost profits are likely to exceed any royalty rate set
by the court.26 In either case, the patentee may also recover pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest.27
20. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 15, at 1284.
21. Id.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
23. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
24. Id. at 1545. A patentee can establish such causation with evidence of: (1) a demand for
the patented product; (2) an absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes; (3) the patentee’s
manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand; and (4) the amount of the profit
the patentee would have made. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152,
1156 (Fed. Cir. 1978). Alternatively, where there are more than two competitors in the market,
the patentee need not prove an absence of acceptable noninfringing alternatives, but instead may
establish its market share and claim lost profits for only that percentage of the infringer’s sales.
State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
25. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1554. The “reasonable royalty” may be based upon an established
royalty, if one exists. Id. If there is no established royalty rate, a court may determine a
reasonable royalty rate by imagining a hypothetical negotiation between the patentee and the
infringer and determining what royalty the parties would have agreed upon at the time
infringement began. Id.
26. Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., 894 F.2d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 284; Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc.,
246 F.3d 1336, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“An award of prejudgment interest serves to make the
patentee whole because the patentee also lost the use of its money due to infringement.”);
Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 180 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Postjudgment
interest . . . serves to compensate a winning plaintiff from the time of a judgment until payment is
made.”).
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Remedies designed to prevent future infringement include injunctive relief,
punitive damages, and attorney fees.28 Both preliminary and permanent
injunctions may be granted.29 Upon a finding of willful infringement, a court
may also, in its discretion, increase the damage award by up to threefold.30
And, in exceptional cases, courts may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.31
An alternative remedy would be to compensate the patent owner for
ongoing infringement through a compulsory licensing scheme. A compulsory
license is generally defined as a “statutorily created license that allows certain
people to pay a royalty and use an invention without the patentee’s
permission.”32 The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) permits member
countries to impose compulsory licensing under certain circumstances.33 A
few countries have imposed compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals,34 and

28. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 15, at 1284.
29. E.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (granting
permanent injunction); Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(granting preliminary injunction); see infra Part I.C.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 284; Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1274 (Fed. Cir.
1999). To determine willfulness, courts look to the totality of the circumstances and determine
whether the evidence establishes that the infringer acted in disregard of the patent and had no
reasonable basis for believing it had a right to engage in the infringing acts. Electro Medical
Systems, S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 285; Park-In-Theaters, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137, 142 (9th Cir. 1951)
(noting that an award of attorney fees should be based on a finding of unfairness or bad faith in
the conduct of the losing party, or some other equitable consideration of similar force which
makes it grossly unjust that the winner should bear the burden of his own attorney fees).
32. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). However, since the
eBay decision, several district courts have denied injunctive relief to patent owners and imposed
what amounts to a compulsory license on a case-by-case basis. Final Judgment, Finisar Corp. v.
The DirecTV Group, Inc., 1:05-CV-264 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006) (explicitly stating that the court
was granting a “compulsory license” to the defendant); see cases cited supra note 8 (denying
injunctive relief and in effect granting compulsory licenses, but not explicitly describing these
rulings as such); see also IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 226 (D. Del.
2007) (declining to “effectively impose a ten-year compulsory license on defendant absent more
information”). But see Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of
Petitioners at 9, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006
WL 1785363 (arguing that case-by-case denials of injunctive relief by courts are not equivalent to
a compulsory license imposed by the legislature).
33. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1209 (1994). While the TRIPS
Agreement does not explicitly use the term “compulsory license,” it does provide for “use of the
subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder.” Id.
34. For instance, India added a compulsory licensing provision to its patent laws in 1970 in
response to a need to provide low cost medicines to the poor. Katherine W. Sands, Prescription

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2008]

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES

991

others have used the threat of compulsory licensing in negotiations with
pharmaceutical companies.35
However, compulsory licensing of patents has long been rejected in the
United States by both Congress and the courts.36 Instead, the United States has
opted for a patent system which provides patent owners with a right to exclude
and enforces that right largely through injunctive relief. This approach finds
support in the language of the Constitution itself.
B.

Constitutional and Statutory Bases for Granting Injunctive Relief in
Patent Infringement Cases

Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”37 The First Congress
enacted the Patent Act of 1790,38 which granted to inventors “the sole and
exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others
to be used the . . . invention or discovery.”39 This “exclusive right” language
persisted in the patent statutes for over 150 years40 and was often
misunderstood as granting to the patentee a positive right to make, use, or sell
the patented invention.41 But as early as 1852, the Supreme Court explained

Drugs: India Values Their Compulsory Licensing Provision—Should the United States Follow in
India’s Footsteps?, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 191, 199 (2006). The post-TRIPS revision of India’s
Patent Act retains the compulsory licensing provision. Id. at 200.
35. For example, in 2005, Brazil threatened to infringe the patent on an anti-AIDS
medication unless Abbott Laboratories, the owner of the patent, agreed to lower the price or
voluntarily grant patent rights to the Brazilian government. Jennifer Bjornberg, Brazil’s Recent
Threat on Abbott’s Patent: Resolution or Retaliation?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 212
(2006). Abbott ultimately agreed to lower the price of the drug, and in return Brazil agreed not to
produce a generic version of the drug domestically. Id. at 220.
36. Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 n.21 (1980) (noting that
compulsory licensing of patents has often been proposed but has never been enacted on a broad
scale); Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing
Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 953–54 (2000) (summarizing U.S. objections to
compulsory licensing). However, during the anthrax attacks that followed on the heels of the
September 11 terrorism, the United States considered imposing compulsory licensing to override
Bayer’s patent on ciprofloxacin (Cipro). David B. Resnick & Kenneth A. De Ville, Bioterrorism
and Patent Rights: “Compulsory Licensure” and the Case of Cipro, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 29, 29
(2002).
37. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
38. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1989) (discussing
the history of the U.S. patent statutes).
39. An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790)
(emphasis added).
40. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
41. Application of Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 871 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
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that “[t]he franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to
exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without
the permission of the patentee.”42 The statutory language was finally clarified
in 1952, when the statute was amended to its current form to provide that a
patent empowers its owner “to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the invention.”43
Although the earliest patent statutes provided only for remedies at law,
injunctive relief was available as early as 1819.44 The 1819 Patent Act
provided:
[T]he circuit courts of the United States . . . shall have authority to grant
injunctions, according to the course and principles of courts of equity, to
prevent the violation of rights of any . . . inventors, secured to them by any
laws of the United States, on such terms and conditions as the said courts may
45
deem fit and reasonable . . . .

The current statutory language is similar: “courts . . . may grant injunctions in
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”46
In sum, the constitutional text and the text of the first Patent Act, when
read together, suggest that the Founders envisioned that injunctive relief would
be available as a remedy for patent infringement. This is confirmed by the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the early patent statutes and the language
used in the 1952 revision of Patent Act. Furthermore, the courts have had a
long history of granting injunctive relief in patent infringement cases.
C. Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Cases Prior to the eBay Decision
In accordance with the constitutional and statutory foundations, courts
have had a long history of granting both preliminary and permanent injunctions
in patent infringement cases. Because the courts have applied slightly different
standards in granting preliminary and permanent injunctions, each type of
relief is considered in turn.

42. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 U.S. 539, 549 (1852).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added); King Instruments, 65 F.3d at 949.
44. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423–24 (1908);
Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
45. An Act To Extend the Jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States to Cases
Arising Under the Law Relating To Patents, Ch. 19, 15 Stat. 481, 481–82 (1819).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 283.
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Permanent Injunctions

Implementing the 1819 Patent Act, the first patent statute to provide for
injunctive relief in patent infringement suits,47 courts began to grant injunctive
relief in patent infringement cases in the early nineteenth century.48 By the
mid-nineteenth century, there was a recognition that a permanent injunction for
the term of the patent was the only remedy adequate to protect the patentee’s
right to exclude, and thus courts often granted injunctions as a matter of
course.49
In non-patent infringement contexts, the Supreme Court has long held that
courts must consider four equitable factors in determining whether to grant a
permanent injunction: (1) whether the plaintiff would be irreparably harmed in
the absence of an injunction; (2) whether the plaintiff has an adequate remedy
at law; (3) whether the balance of hardships tips in favor of the plaintiff; and
(4) whether granting an injunction would be consistent with the public
interest.50 In accordance with these equitable principles, pre-Federal Circuit
courts sometimes denied injunctive relief to patent owners. For example, in
City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that where
enjoining the city from infringing patents for a sewage purification process
would leave an entire community without any means for the disposal of raw
sewage other than running it into Lake Michigan, a permanent injunction
should not be granted.51 The court noted that patent rights are ordinarily
protected by enjoining the infringer, but concluded that in this instance, the
interests of the public outweighed those of the patentee.52 Similarly, in Nerney
v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., the Second Circuit declined to issue an
injunction where doing so would have caused considerable inconvenience to
the public by slowing down train schedules.53 In another case, the Second
47. See supra Part I.B.
48. E.g., Ogle v. Ege, 18 F. Cas. 619, 620 (C.C. Pa. 1826).
49. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1041–45 (thoroughly reviewing the early standards governing
permanent injunctive relief in patent infringement cases); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“From at least the early 19th
century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority
of patent cases.”).
50. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (discussing all four factors);
Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506–07 (1959) (“The basis of injunctive relief
in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.”);
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944) (discussing the balance of hardships factor);
R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (“The history of equity
jurisdiction is the history of regard for public consequences in employing the extraordinary
remedy of the injunction.”); Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919) (noting that an
injunction should not be granted unless “necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury”).
51. 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934).
52. Id.
53. 83 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1936).
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Circuit upheld a denial of injunctive relief and grant of a compulsory license,
finding that it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that since the
defendant manufactured a product and the patent owner did not, injunctive
relief would “impose irreparable hardship on the infringer . . . without any
concomitant benefit to the patentee.”54 Finally, in Bliss v. City of Brooklyn, the
court declined to enjoin the city from infringing patented fire hose couplings,
where the couplings were necessary for daily use in the city for the prevention
of fires.55
When the Federal Circuit was established in 1982, it developed a general
rule that injunctive relief should ordinarily be granted in patent infringement
cases once the patent has been found valid and infringed. In Richardson v.
Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., the court stated that “[i]t is the general rule that an
injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound
reason for denying it.”56 Similarly, in W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v.
Garlock, Inc., the court asserted that “injunctive relief against an adjudged
infringer is usually granted,” and “an injunction should issue once
infringement has been established unless there is a sufficient reason for
denying it.”57
The justification for the general rule in favor of granting injunctive relief
was summarized by the Federal Circuit in Smith International, Inc. v. Hughes
Tool Co.:
Without this injunctive power of the courts, the right to exclude granted by the
patent would be diminished, and the express purpose of the Constitution and
Congress, to promote the progress of the useful arts, would be seriously
undermined. The patent owner would lack much of the “leverage,” afforded
by the right to exclude, to enjoy the full value of his invention in the market
place. Without the right to obtain an injunction, the right to exclude granted to
the patentee would have only a fraction of the value it was intended to have,
and would no longer be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific
58
and technological research.

The Federal Circuit has further noted that “it is contrary to the laws of
property, of which the patent law partakes, to deny the patentee’s right to
exclude others from use of his property. The right to exclude recognized in a
patent is but the essence of the concept of property.”59
54. Foster v. Amer. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974). However,
this holding seems to be directly at odds with Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
Co., where the Supreme Court held that a patent owner is not required to practice the patented
invention in order to be entitled to injunctive relief. 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
55. 3 F. Cas. 706, 707 (C.C. E.D.N.Y. 1871).
56. 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
57. 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
58. 718 F.2d 1573, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
59. Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1246–47 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted).
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Despite its general rule in favor of injunctive relief, the Federal Circuit has
recognized that a finding of patent validity and infringement does not require
that an injunction issue.60 In fact, the Federal Circuit has occasionally upheld
denials of permanent injunctive relief.61
2.

Preliminary Injunctions and the Presumption of Irreparable Harm

In contrast to the general rule in favor of injunctive relief that the Federal
Circuit applied in the permanent injunction context, the courts have long
applied a four-factor equitable balancing test when determining whether to
grant a preliminary injunction in a patent infringement case. Specifically, a
court must assess: (1) whether the patent owner is likely to prevail on the
merits; (2) whether the patent owner will be irreparably harmed if the
injunction is not granted; (3) the balance of the hardships between the parties;
and (4) the impact of an injunction on the public interest.62 Also, in the
preliminary injunction context, the Federal Circuit has long held that once the
patent owner has established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits
by making a clear showing of both validity and infringement, the court should
presume that the patentee will be irreparably harmed if the alleged infringer is
not enjoined.63 The Federal Circuit has justified this presumption in part by
pointing to the finite term of the patent grant.64 Specifically, the Federal
Circuit has observed that “patent expiration is not suspended during litigation,
and the passage of time can work irremediable harm.”65
However, the courts’ practices of applying a presumption of irreparable
harm in preliminary injunction determinations and granting permanent
injunctions in the vast majority of patent infringement cases have not been

60. Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Roche
Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 866 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
61. Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(upholding district court’s denial of injunctive relief where the patent owner’s proposed
injunction lacked the specificity and reasonable detail required by FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d), the
parties’ discovery stipulation precluded relief for infringing activity after August 21, 2001, the
issues of proof would not necessarily adhere in a damages analysis for infringement after that
date, and injunctive relief that had already been granted by the International Trade Commission
subsumed the relief that the patent owner sought from the district court); Odetics, 185 F.3d at
1272–74 (upholding a denial of injunctive relief where the district court had concluded that the
plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit constituted laches).
62. E.g., Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int’l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
63. E.g., Polymer Techs, Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Smith Int’l,
718 F.2d at 1581.
64. Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1247.
65. Id. (quoting H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
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without their critics. In recent years, two concerns in particular have come to
the forefront.
D. The “Patent Troll” and “Patent Holdup” Dilemmas
Two related and perplexing issues tied to permanent injunctions in patent
cases have sparked much heated debate in the patent law community of late:
the “patent troll” and the “patent holdup.”
No universally accepted definition for the term “patent troll” exists.66 The
term was first used to refer to a person or entity who “tries to make a lot of
money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of
practicing and in most cases never practiced.”67 The entities typically labeled
as trolls have two salient features in common. First, they acquire the rights to
multiple patents; often patents that are broad in scope and claim business
methods or computer-related technology.68 Second, they make their money,
not by manufacturing or selling a product or by providing a service, but by
identifying companies who may be infringing the patents they own and using
the threat of litigation, and the threat of a permanent injunction in particular, to
extract licensing fees.69
The threat of being permanently enjoined can put considerable pressure on
an infringer to settle. For example, in perhaps the most widely-publicized
“patent troll” case to date, NTP, a patent holding company and the supposed
troll, sued Research in Motion (RIM), maker of the popular BlackBerry
wireless e-mail device.70 Just before an injunction that would have cut off
service to most U.S. BlackBerry users was expected to issue, RIM agreed to
pay NTP the extraordinary sum of $612.5 million for a license.71
A closely-related, and perhaps more well-defined, issue is the “patent
holdup” problem. This problem stems from the fact that many modern
technologies—including many inventions in the information technology field
and some types of biotechnology inventions—are made up of hundreds, if not
thousands of components, each of which may be covered by the claims of one
or more patents.72 Some scholars argue that for such technologies, injunctive
relief in favor of the holder of a patent for a small or insignificant component

66. See Terrence P. McMahon et al., Who Is a Troll? Not a Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA
CONF. J. 159, 160–63 (2006).
67. Id. at 159 (quoting Peter Detkin, former assistant counsel at Intel Corp.).
68. See id. at 161–63; Raymond P. Niro & Paul K. Vickrey, The Patent Troll Myth, 7
SEDONA CONF. J. 153, 153 (2006).
69. See McMahon et al., supra note 66, at 161–63; Niro & Vickrey, supra note 68, at 153.
70. Ian Austen, BlackBerry Service to Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at C1.
71. Id.
72. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 1992 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and
One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 150 (2007).
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may not be appropriate.73 In particular, these scholars argue that the
justification for the availability of equitable relief in patent infringement cases
is to ensure that such relief will be available to those persons who need it to
protect their markets or ensure a return on their investment, not to allow an
individual or an entity that owns a patent on a small component of a highlycomplex product to use the threat of an injunction to “extract a greater share of
the value of that product than their patent warrants.”74 In short, entities that
own patents which cover the components of complex technologies may be able
to pressure companies that may be infringing their patents into settling for an
amount that far exceeds what the patented invention is actually worth.75
A particularly extreme hypothetical example of the patent holdup problem
can be found in the DNA microarray. A DNA microarray consists of a solid
support, to which tens of thousands of short DNA fragments are affixed.76
These microarrays, or “DNA chips” as they are colloquially called, are widely
used in biotechnology research and drug discovery.77 It is conceivable that
each individual DNA fragment in the array could be covered by the claims of
one or more patents.78 Those concerned with patent holdups fear that a
company that wished to produce such a microarray could face the problem of
being required to obtain licenses from an enormous number of patent owners.79
Further, each of these individual patent owners might try to extract value
disproportionate to what their individual patented DNA molecule is worth by
threatening the microarray producer with a permanent injunction.80
As will be seen from a careful examination of the majority and concurring
opinions in the Supreme Court’s decision in the eBay case,81 concerns about
patent trolls and patent holdups were likely a driving factor behind the
Supreme Court’s decision to hear the eBay case and likely had a substantial
impact on the Court’s ultimate holding.

73. Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioners at 6–
7, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 1785363.
74. Id. at 5–7.
75. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 72, at 1993.
76. E.g., Stephen H. Friend & Roland B. Stoughton, The Magic of Microarrays, SCI. AM.,
Feb. 2002, at 44, 46.
77. Id. at 45–46. For example, microarrays can be used to monitor simultaneously the
expression levels of various genes (i.e., to determine which genes are “turned on” and which are
“turned off” under certain conditions or in certain cell types). Id. at 48.
78. F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering
Solution to the Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. REV. 111, 112 (2007).
79. Id.
80. See Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 73, at 5–6.
81. See infra Part II.D.
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II. EBAY, INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE, L.L.C.: A REJECTION OF THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT’S GENERAL RULE IN FAVOR OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A.

The Facts of eBay

Plaintiff MercExchange, L.L.C. was the assignee of several business
method patents, including a patent on an electronic market designed to
facilitate the sale of goods between private individuals.82 The defendants,
eBay, Inc. and Half.com, operated websites that allowed private sellers to sell
goods through auctions or at fixed prices.83 MercExchange had previously
licensed its patents to other companies, and sought to license its patents to
eBay and Half.com, but the parties failed to reach an agreement.84
MercExchange then filed a patent infringement suit against eBay and
Half.com.85
B.

The District Court’s First Denial of Injunctive Relief

The jury found that MercExchange’s patent was valid and that the
defendants had willfully infringed, and awarded $35 million in damages to
MercExchange.86 MercExchange then filed a motion requesting that the
defendants be enjoined permanently from infringing its patents.87
The court held that injunctive relief was not warranted under the
circumstances.88 Citing one of its previous decisions, the court asserted that
the issuance of an injunction following a verdict of infringement is not
automatic, and that district courts must instead consider traditional equitable
principles in deciding whether to grant an injunction.89 Specifically, the court
stated that it was required to consider: (1) whether the plaintiff would be
irreparably injured if an injunction did not issue; (2) whether the plaintiff had
an adequate remedy at law; (3) whether granting an injunction was in the
public interest; and (4) whether the balance of the hardships favored the
plaintiff.90

82. eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006); see U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed
Nov. 7, 1995).
83. eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 390–91; MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698 (E.D. Va.
2003).
87. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 699, 710–11.
88. Id. at 715.
89. Id. at 711 (citing Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788 (E.D. Va.
1998)).
90. Id.
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In considering the first factor, the court asserted that when validity and
infringement have been clearly established, immediate irreparable harm is
presumed.91 The court listed several factors it considered relevant in the
rebuttal of this presumption, including whether the infringer has ceased its
infringing activity, whether the patentee has previously granted licenses such
that it can be adequately compensated with money damages, whether the
patentee has delayed in filing suit, and lack of commercial activity on the part
of the patentee.92
MercExchange argued that it would be irreparably harmed if the
defendants were not enjoined because it would be “deprived of its ability to
either pursue the development of its inventions under the protection of its
patent rights, or to have the exclusive right to license its patented technology to
others on the most beneficial terms available.”93 The court rejected these
arguments and held that the defendants had rebutted the presumption of
irreparable harm.94 In particular, the court emphasized that MercExchange did
not practice its inventions and existed “merely to license its patented
Moreover, the court stressed the fact that
technology to others.”95
MercExchange had made comments to the media before, during, and after trial
indicating that it did not seek to enjoin eBay, but rather was only seeking
damages for the infringement.96 The court also accorded weight to the fact that
MercExchange had not moved for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that if
MercExchange truly believed that it was being irreparably harmed by the
defendants’ activities, “such a motion would have been appropriate.”97
The court also found that MercExchange had an adequate remedy at law.98
While acknowledging that many cases had stated that monetary damages are
often inadequate in that they limit the patent holder in exercising its
“monopoly power,” the court asserted that this was not a typical case.99 The
court reasoned that since MercExchange had previously licensed its patents to
others and had been willing to license to the defendants, monetary damages
would provide sufficient compensation.100

91. See id. at 711 (citing Odetics, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 794). Applying such a presumption in
the context of a permanent injunction was not a common practice prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in eBay. See supra Part I.C. Most courts applied a presumption of irreparable harm only
in the context of preliminary injunctions. Id.
92. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
93. Id. at 711.
94. Id. at 712.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
98. Id. at 713.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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In considering whether granting an injunction would be consistent with the
public interest, the court recognized that this factor often favors the patentee,
because the public has a strong interest in maintaining the integrity of the
patent system.101 However, the court went on to reason that the public interest
is not served where a patentee obtains a patent but does not allow the public to
benefit from the patented invention, because this practice undermines the goal
of encouraging others to improve on the invention.102 The court also cited
growing concerns about the issuance of business method patents of
questionable validity.103 The court concluded that the public interest factor
equally favored granting an injunction to protect the plaintiff’s patent rights
and denying an injunction to protect the public interest in using a patented
invention that the patent holder declined to practice.104
Finally, in balancing the hardships to the parties, the court concluded that
the balance tipped “slightly in the defendants’ favor.”105 The court again noted
that MercExchange was not developing or commercializing its patents, but
rather existed solely to license its patents and sue to enforce its patents.106 The
court was also concerned that issuing an injunction would lead to multiple
contempt hearings and “extraordinary costs to the parties, as well as
considerable judicial resources,” because the defendants were likely to begin
using proposed “design-arounds” which MercExchange contended would also
infringe its patents.107
Thus, after considering all four equitable factors, the court ultimately
concluded that MercExchange’s motion for permanent injunctive relief should
be denied.108

101. Id.
102. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 714. This argument is flawed, because here,
MercExchange did grant licenses to others, just not to the defendants. Id. at 713. Thus, even
though MercExchange itself did not practice the invention, the public was still permitted to
benefit from the invention.
103. Id. at 713–14 (noting that this concern was not dispositive, but weighed against the
imposition of an injunction, particularly in a case where the patentee did not practice, nor have
any intention of practicing, its patented invention).
104. Id. at 714.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 714.
108. Id. at 715. In addition to refusing to grant injunctive relief, the court also declined to
award enhanced damages to MercExchange, despite upholding the jury’s finding that the
infringement had been willful. Id. at 701–02, 722. In upholding the jury’s finding of willfulness,
the court focused on two key factors. First, the defendants knew of MercExchange’s patents, but
failed to obtain an opinion of counsel on willfulness and did not conduct a patent clearance
investigation. Id. at 701. Second, the defendants had argued at trial that they could have
designed around MercExchange’s patents for less than $15,000. Id. The court reasoned that the
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C. The Federal Circuit Reverses
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of injunctive
relief.109 The court reiterated its general rule that once a patent has been found
valid and infringed, the court should ordinarily grant injunctive relief, because
the “right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that courts have
property.”110
sometimes “exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in order to
protect the public interest.”111 Thus, courts may decline to enter an injunction
in an “exceptional” case where “a patentee’s failure to practice the patented
invention frustrates an important public need for the invention, such as the
need to use the invention to protect public health.”112
However, in the Federal Circuit’s view, the present case was not
sufficiently exceptional to justify a denial of injunctive relief.113 In particular,
the court emphasized that a general concern about validity of business method
patents was “not the type of important public need that justifies the unusual
step of denying injunctive relief.”114
The Federal Circuit also rejected the district court’s argument that
injunctive relief should be denied because if an injunction were granted, the
defendants would attempt to design around the patented invention, and this in
turn would result in numerous contempt hearings at which the court would be
required to determine whether the design-around also infringed
MercExchange’s patent.115 The court stressed that continuing disputes of this
type are not unusual in patent cases, and thus this was not a sufficient basis for

defendants’ failure to take this simple and inexpensive step, which would have avoided the
necessity of litigation, weighed against them. Id.
However, the court also opined that a finding of willful infringement did not require it to
award enhanced damages. Id. at 719. Rather, this decision is within the court’s discretion and is
based primarily on the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct. Id. Here, the court found that
the defendants’ conduct was not sufficiently egregious to justify an award of enhanced damages.
Id. at 721. The court also declined to award attorney fees to MercExchange. Id. at 722 (noting
that many of the same factors that are relevant in determining whether to award enhanced
damages are also relevant in determining whether to award attorney fees).
109. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005). However,
the court held that the district court had not abused its discretion in declining to award enhanced
damages and attorney fees. Id.
110. Id. at 1338 (quoting Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47) (Fed.
Cir. 1989)); see supra Part I.C.1.
111. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338.
112. Id. at 1338–39 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir.
1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. at 1339.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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denying injunctive relief.116 Moreover, even absent an injunction, a dispute
could continue in the form of successive infringement actions.117
In addition, the Federal Circuit rejected the argument that because
MercExchange had expressed a willingness to license its patents, it should be
deprived of a permanent injunction.118 The court reasoned:
Injunctions are not reserved for patentees who intend to practice their patents,
as opposed to those who choose to license. The statutory right to exclude is
equally available to both groups, and the right to an adequate remedy to
enforce that right should be equally available to both as well. If the injunction
gives the patentee additional leverage in licensing, that is a natural
consequence of the right to exclude and not an inappropriate reward to a party
119
that does not intend to compete in the marketplace with potential infringers.

Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected the argument that since MercExchange
had failed to move for a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction should
be denied, reasoning that preliminary injunctions and permanent injunctions
“are distinct forms of equitable relief that have different prerequisites and serve
entirely different purposes.”120
In sum, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was no reason to depart
from its “general rule” in favor of granting permanent injunctive relief upon a
finding of patent validity and infringement.121
D. The Supreme Court’s Decision
1.

Justice Thomas’s Majority Opinion: Traditional Equitable Principles
Governing the Grant of Permanent Injunctions Apply to Patent
Disputes

Writing for the majority in the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas noted that
according to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must show that: (1) it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, an
equitable remedy is warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be harmed
by a permanent injunction.122 Moreover, the decision to grant or deny

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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permanent injunctive relief is an act within the equitable discretion of the
district court.123
The majority held that these equitable principles “apply with equal force to
disputes arising under the Patent Act.”124 The majority asserted that there was
no indication that Congress intended a departure from traditional equitable
principles for patent disputes.125 The Court recognized that 35 U.S.C. § 261
declares that “patents shall have the attributes of personal property” and that 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) confers on patent holders “the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the [patented] invention.”126
However, the Court reasoned that, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s view, a
statutory right to exclude does not by itself justify a general rule in favor of
injunctive relief.127 Specifically, the Court drew a distinction between “the
creation of a right” and “the provision of remedies for violations of that
right.”128 The Court also stressed that the statutory language does not appear
to require a general rule in favor of granting injunctions: 35 U.S.C. § 261
provides that patents shall have the attributes of personal property “[s]ubject to
the provisions of this title” and 35 U.S.C. § 283 provides that “injunctive relief
‘may’ issue only ‘in accordance with the principles of equity.’”129
The Court concluded that the traditional equitable principles call for an
individualized assessment of the merits of injunctive relief, and both the
Federal Circuit and district court had failed to do this.130 While the district
court had recited the traditional four-factor test, it “appeared to adopt certain
expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad
swath of cases.”131 In particular, the Supreme Court disapproved of the district
court’s conclusion that a plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents and lack
of commercial activity in practicing its invention would automatically establish
that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
injunctive relief.132 Justice Thomas stated that “traditional equitable principles
do not permit such broad classifications” and reasoned that such a categorical
rule was not consistent with the principles of equity.133 The Court observed:
[S]ome patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors,
might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 391–92.
Id. at 392.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 392.
Id.
Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 283).
See id. at 393.
Id.
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 393.
Id.
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secure the financing necessary to bring their works to market themselves.
Such patent holders may be able to satisfy the traditional four-factor test, and
134
we see no basis for categorically denying them the opportunity to do so.

The Court also emphasized that a categorical rule would be inconsistent with
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., in which the Supreme
Court held that injunctive relief could be granted to a patent holder who has
unreasonably declined to use the patent.135
The Court likewise disapproved of the Federal Circuit’s “general rule . . .
that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have
been adjudged” except in “unusual” cases where there are “exceptional
circumstances” or in “rare instances . . . to protect the public interest.”136 In
the Court’s view, the Federal Circuit’s approach also failed to focus
sufficiently on the facts of individual cases.137
In short, the majority concluded that the neither the District Court nor the
Federal Circuit had correctly applied the four-factor equitable test in
determining whether MercExchange was entitled to a permanent injunction.138
Thus, the Court vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the
case to the district court for application of the four-factor equitable relief
test.139 The Court expressly stated that it was taking no position on whether
injunctive relief should be granted, emphasizing that it was holding only that in
patent disputes as well as in other cases, “the decision whether to grant or deny
injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts,
and . . . such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles
of equity . . . .”140
2.

The Chief Justice’s Concurring Opinion: Courts Should Consider
History in Applying Traditional Equitable Principles

Chief Justice Roberts, joined in his concurrence by Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg, agreed with the majority’s holding that “the decision as to whether
to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the
district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with
traditional principles of equity . . . .”141 But Chief Justice Roberts went on to
stress that since at least the early nineteenth century, courts have granted

134. Id.
135. Id. at 393.
136. Id. at 393–94 (quoting MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)).
137. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent
cases.142 Chief Justice Roberts explained that this longstanding practice was
not surprising, “given the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through
monetary remedies that allow an infringer to use an invention against the
patentee’s wishes—a difficulty that often implicates the first two factors of the
traditional four-factor test.”143 The Chief Justice agreed with the majority,
however, that this historical practice “does not entitle a patentee to a permanent
injunction or justify a general rule that such injunctions should issue.”144
The Chief Justice stressed that history may be instructive in applying the
four-factor test for injunctive relief in patent cases.145 In particular, the Chief
Justice cautioned that exercising equitable discretion pursuant to the
established four-factor test should not amount to “writing on an entirely clean
slate.”146 He further reasoned that “[d]iscretion is not whim, and limiting
discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic principle of
justice that like cases should be decided alike.”147 Finally, the Chief Justice
asserted that in discerning and applying such legal standards, “a page of history
is worth a volume of logic.”148
3.

Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion: History May be Instructive,
but District Courts Should Consider Whether Past Practices Fit the
Circumstances of the Cases Before Them

Justice Kennedy was joined in his concurrence by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer.149 At the outset, Justice Kennedy noted that the majority was
correct in holding that courts should apply the traditional four-factor equitable
test in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief in patent cases.150 Justice
Kennedy also agreed with the Chief Justice that history may be instructive in
applying the equitable principles.151
However, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the Chief Justice that the
traditional practice of permanently enjoining patent infringers “rest[s] on the
‘difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that

142. eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital
Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005)).
148. Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
149. Id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 395–96.
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allow an infringer to use an invention against the patentee’s wishes.’”152
Instead, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that both the Patent Act and
the traditional view of injunctive relief recognize that the existence of a right to
exclude does not dictate that a permanent injunction be the remedy for a
violation of that right.153 Justice Kennedy posited that to the extent that earlier
cases had established a pattern of nearly always granting such injunctions,
“this . . . simply illustrate[d] the result of the four-factor test in the contexts
then prevalent.”154 Thus, in Justice Kennedy’s view, “[t]he lesson of the
historical practice” of granting injunctions against patent infringers would be
most instructive when the “circumstances of a case bear substantial parallels to
litigation the courts have confronted before.”155
Justice Kennedy went on to suggest that some modern cases are not like
the past cases that the courts have encountered, stating that in certain modern
cases, “the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of
the patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier cases.”156 While
not using the terms “patent troll” or “patent holdup,”157 Justice Kennedy noted
that “[a]n industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing
fees,” and that such firms can use the threat of an injunction “as a bargaining
tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice
the patent.”158 In addition, Justice Kennedy argued that “[w]hen the patented
invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to
produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage
in negotiations,” money damages may suffice to compensate the patent owner
and an injunction may not be in the public interest.159
Justice Kennedy concluded his concurrence by noting that giving district
courts equitable discretion over injunctions allows the courts “to adapt to . . .
rapid technological and legal developments in the patent system.”160 In sum,
in deciding whether to grant an injunction, district courts should “determine
whether past practice fits the circumstances of the cases before them.”161

152. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 395
(Roberts, C.J., concurring)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See supra Part I.D.
158. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 396–97.
160. Id. at 397.
161. Id.
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The District Court’s Decision on Remand: The Second Denial of
Injunctive Relief

On remand, the district court again denied MercExchange’s motion for
permanent injunctive relief.162 Prior to making this determination, the court
reopened the record to allow the parties to update the court on factual
developments occurring since its previous decision.163 This process alerted the
court to two relevant post-trial developments. First, while the appeal was
pending, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted
eBay’s request for reexamination proceedings of MercExchange’s patents and
issued non-final actions indicating that both patents were invalid on
obviousness grounds.164 Second, in 2004, MercExchange granted uBid, Inc., a
competitor of eBay, a nonexclusive license to its entire patent portfolio.165
Under the terms of the license, uBid made one fixed payment of $150,000, and
would begin paying royalties when uBid’s annual qualified gross market sales
reached $500 million.166 uBid’s CEO indicated that the company had entered
into this licensing agreement in part to avoid costly litigation.167 In addition, in
2006, shortly after the Supreme Court’s remand, uBid considered selling a
twenty-five percent interest in its company to MercExchange in return for an
exclusive license for one of MercExchange’s patents, but these negotiations
ultimately failed.168
1.

Rejecting the Presumption of Irreparable Harm

The district court first considered whether the presumption of irreparable
harm had survived the Supreme Court’s decision.169 While recognizing that
the Supreme Court’s opinion did not “squarely address” this issue, the district
court concluded based on a review of the language of the Supreme Court’s
decision and other relevant case law that such a presumption no longer
exists.170 However, the court noted:
Although a presumption of irreparable harm is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s instruction that traditional equitable principles require the plaintiff to

162. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559 (E.D. Va. 2007).
163. Id. at 560.
164. Id. eBay sought to stay the proceedings with respect to both patents at issue pending
resolution of the reexamination proceedings. Id. at 562. The district court issued a stay with
respect to one of the patents, but declined to issue a stay with respect to the other. Id. at 563
165. Id. at 561.
166. Id.
167. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
168. Id. at 562.
169. Id. at 568.
170. Id. (citing z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
and Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006)).
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demonstrate that it has suffered an irreparable injury, the court is not blind to
the reality that the nature of the right protected by a patent, the right to
exclude, will frequently result in a plaintiff successfully establishing
171
irreparable harm in the wake of establishing validity and infringement.

Nonetheless, the court concluded that “putting the onus on the plaintiff to
prove irreparable harm is much more than an idle exercise[,] as numerous case
specific facts may weigh against the issuance of an injunction notwithstanding
the nature of the patent holder’s right.”172 Thus, the court concluded that “a
permanent injunction shall only issue if [the] plaintiff carries its burden of
establishing that, based on traditional equitable principles, the case specific
facts warrant entry of an injunction.”173
2.

Applying of the Four-Factor Equitable Test

Applying the four-factor test as explicated by the Supreme Court to the
facts at hand, the district court did not stray far from its original reasoning.
Rather, the district court in large part simply fine-tuned its opinion to respond
to the Supreme Court’s criticisms of its original approach.
a.

Irreparable Harm

The district court devoted considerable discussion to the irreparable harm
factor and ultimately concluded that MercExchange had not carried its
burden.174 The court reasoned that despite MercExchange’s post-trial business
relationship with uBid, MercExchange had both “acted inconsistently with
defending its right to exclude” and “failed to establish why its harm [was]
irreparable.”175 As in its original opinion, the district court emphasized that
MercExchange had consistently failed to practice the inventions covered by its
patents and instead exhibited a willingness to license, thus evincing its
willingness to forgo its right to exclude in return for monetary
compensation.176 The court noted that MercExchange had not deviated from
this course of action in its post-trial activities, as it had once again exhibited a
willingness to license its patents in its dealings with uBid.177 The court
conceded that this consistent practice of licensing did not bar MercExchange
from the opportunity to obtain injunctive relief, but maintained that this was
171. Id. at 569 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) for the proposition that it is not surprising that injunctive relief is often
granted in patent cases, “given the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary
remedies”).
172. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 569.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 569–82.
175. Id. at 569.
176. Id. at 570.
177. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
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one factor that the court was required to consider in weighing the equities.178
To support this contention, the court stated that it was “taking a page from
history,” in that the Federal Circuit had on several occasions recognized that a
lack of commercial activity on the part of a patentee could be considered in
determining whether a patentee would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
injunctive relief.179
The court distinguished the facts of the present case from situations in
which self-made inventors or university researchers opt to license their
inventions rather that developing the patented products themselves.180 In
particular, the court noted that the self-made inventor or researcher is generally
still seeking to develop their patented product, whereas here, MercExchange’s
business model appeared to be to seek out and negotiate licenses with
companies already participating in the market and infringing or potentially
infringing.181
The court also emphasized once again that MercExchange had not sought a
preliminary injunction.182 While recognizing that this factor was not
dispositive, the court asserted that it was “yet another factor in the calculus
indicating both that MercExchange is not being irreparably harmed . . . .”183
The court also emphasized, as it had in its first opinion, that
MercExchange’s patent was directed to a business method.184 The court
concluded that given growing concerns over the validity of such patents and
the Supreme Court’s recent decision on the obviousness standard in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., this factor weighed against a finding of
irreparable harm.185
The court recognized that “MercExchange’s relationship with uBid had the
potential to provide . . . evidence of irreparable harm,” but nonetheless held
that this relationship was insufficient to carry MercExchange’s burden.186
First, the court reasoned that MercExchange’s 2004 license to uBid indicated a
continuing willingness license on the part of MercExchange.187 Second, the
178. Id.
179. Id. at 570–71.
180. Id. at 571–72.
181. Id. at 572.
182. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 573.
183. Id. (noting that the evidence indicated that MercExchange’s failure to seek a preliminary
injunction was impacted by its willingness to accept a royalty and reasoning that “if
MercExchange’s true goal was to defend its right to exclude, it would likely have at least
attempted to stop eBay” from further establishing its dominance in the market during litigation).
184. Id. at 574.
185. Id. at 574–75. In particular, the court noted that the nature of MercExchange’s claimed
invention as a combination of non-unique elements yielding predictable results made it less likely
that the patent would survive reexamination under the standard announced in KSR. Id. at 575.
186. Id.
187. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
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court noted that uBid was motivated to enter the licensing agreement at least in
part by a desire to avoid the expense of litigation.188 Third, the court stressed
that the failure of the negotiations surrounding the proposed exclusive license
resulted not only from the fact that eBay had not been enjoined, but also from
uBid’s uncertainty as to the outcome of the reexamination proceedings and
whether eBay had successfully designed around MercExchange’s patent.189
Finally, the court observed that the timing of the negotiations between
MercExchange and uBid was somewhat suspect—the fact that the negotiations
had commenced shortly after the Supreme Court’s remand indicated that
MercExchange had “acted with an eye toward the upcoming injunction
dispute.”190
In sum, MercExchange failed to carry its burden of showing that injunctive
relief was necessary to prevent irreparable harm to its market share, reputation,
goodwill, brand recognition, customer base, or future research and
development opportunities, and had “repeatedly indicate[d] that it was willing
to forgo its right to exclude and license its patents to eBay and others.”191
b.

Adequate Remedy at Law

The court began by noting that the question of whether MercExchange had
an adequate remedy at law overlapped with the irreparable harm issue.192
Thus, the court again emphasized that MercExchange had not developed its
patented invention, but rather had a pattern of using the patent “as a sword to
aid in litigation or threatened litigation against infringers or potential
infringers.”193 The court concluded that MercExchange was part of the
“industry that has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing
fees.”194 The court also stressed that MercExchange itself, in its pre-trial
negotiations with eBay, statements to the public, and dealings with uBid, had
indicated that it could be compensated with money damages.195 Thus, the
court concluded that MercExchange had an adequate remedy at law.196

188. Id. at 575–76
189. Id. at 576.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 569, 581.
192. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 582.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks and alternations omitted)).
195. Id. at 583.
196. Id.
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Balance of the Hardships

The court concluded that the balance of the hardships favored neither
party, given the uncertainties as to whether MercExchange would be able to
partner with uBid and compete in the market, whether eBay had successfully
designed around MercExchange’s patent, and whether the patent would
survive the reexamination proceedings.197
On one side of the equation, eBay was an adjudicated willful infringer.198
Furthermore, eBay claimed that it had designed around the patent, and if true,
this would mean that eBay would not be harmed by the issuance of an
injunction.199
But on the other side of the balancing equation, MercExchange seemed to
exist solely to license its patents to established companies that infringed or
might infringe its patents, and this “specialization in obtaining fees through
threatened litigation” suggested that MercExchange would “not suffer a
hardship from a similar resolution of the instant matter.”200 The court
acknowledged MercExchange’s argument that if eBay were enjoined from
selling goods at a fixed price and customers began using uBid instead,
MercExchange would receive royalties from uBid, but concluded that forcing
eBay to pay a similar royalty for its infringing sales would yield the same
result.201 Either way, MercExchange would receive a fixed royalty.202 The
court conceded that “forced royalties” are not a perfect solution, but
maintained that such a remedy is the most equitable solution when a patent
holder repeatedly indicates “that a royalty from market participants . . . is what
it truly seeks.”203
Finally, the court considered the potential irreparable harm that eBay might
suffer if it was enjoined from selling goods at a fixed price.204 eBay faced a
substantial risk of irreparable harm from such an injunction, since it could lose
customers and transactions only to have the USPTO declare later that
MercExchange’s patents had never been valid.205 In sum, the court could not
determine with confidence which party the balance of the hardships factor
favored.206

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 583.
Id. at 583–84.
Id. at 584.
Id.
Id. at 584–85.
MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 585.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 585–86.
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The Public Interest

The court devoted considerable discussion to whether enjoining eBay
would serve the public interest and ultimately concluded that this factor
weighed slightly against injunctive relief.207 As it had in its original opinion,
the court recognized that the public interest often favors granting injunctive
relief because the public has an interest in maintaining the integrity of the
patent system.208 Nonetheless, the court asserted that this should not be
permitted to dominate the court’s analysis of the public interest factor, “lest a
presumption results.”209 Rather, the court chose to consider “the type of patent
involved, the impact on the market, the impact on the patent system, and any
other factor that may impact the public at large.”210
First, the court noted that MercExchange’s patent was a “business method
patent that appear[ed] to rely upon combining non-unique elements into a
unique combination,” and that interim findings of the USPTO in the
reexamination proceeding had twice indicated that the claims of the patent
were invalid as obvious.211
Second, the court noted that eBay is a multibillion dollar corporation with
an online marketplace that involves millions of buyers and sellers and has a
substantial impact on the economy.212 MercExchange, on the other hand, had
only two employees and appeared to specialize in obtaining royalties based on
the threat of litigation.213 The court recognized that the public benefits from a
strong patent system that protects small patentees from infringement at the
hands of multibillion dollar corporations, but asserted that the strongest
equitable argument exists when the small patentee uses its patent to benefit the
public, either by developing the patent on its own or through licensing
agreements.214 But here, MercExchange had chosen to license its patents to
market participants who were allegedly infringing, indicating that “a strong
patent system need not rescue MercExchange through equitable
measures. . . .”215
Third, because both parties had alleged misconduct on the part of the other,
the court considered the behavior of the parties throughout the trial and
subsequent to the trial.216 The court concluded that “neither side ha[d]

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 586–90.
Id. at 586.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 588.
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particularly clean hands as both ha[d] engaged in litigation tactics that at times
may have crossed the line,” but at the same time “neither side ha[d]
successfully proven the other to be unworthy of a ruling in equity due to
unclean hands.”217
Finally, the court recognized that eBay’s status as willful infringer favored
MercExchange, but concluded that eBay’s willfulness was insufficient to tip
the public interest factor in MercExchange’s favor.218 In so deciding, the court
rejected a rule that the public interest favors an injunction in all cases where
there has been a finding of willfulness, concluding that in such cases the court
must still consider the factual history of the case, including the patentee’s prior
acts, the parties’ relative positions in the market, the nature of the patent at
issue, and its impact on the public.219
Thus, the court concluded that the public interest factor weighed against
injunctive relief.220
In sum, after applying the four-factor equitable test, the district court
concluded that MercExchange had not met its burden of establishing that it
would suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction, that MercExchange had an
adequate remedy at law, that the balance of the harms favored neither party,
and that the public interest factor weighed in favor of denying injunctive
relief.221 Thus, the court once again denied MercExchange’s motion for a
permanent injunction.222
III. COURTS SHOULD APPLY A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE
HARM UPON A FINDING OF PATENT VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT
This Part begins by summarizing the current status of the presumption of
irreparable harm. This Part then explains why applying such a presumption
would not be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay.
Subparts C and D argue that the courts should apply a rebuttable presumption
of irreparable harm in order to preserve the fundamental nature of the patent
grant as a right to exclude and promote certainty and uniformity in a
substantial subset of patent infringement cases. Finally, Subpart E provides a
non-exhaustive catalogue of situations in which it may be appropriate for a
court to hold that an accused infringer has rebutted the presumption of
irreparable harm, or that the irreparable harm factor is outweighed by another
equitable consideration.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 591.
MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
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Post-eBay Uncertainty as to the Continuing Validity of the Presumption of
Irreparable Harm

In light of the eBay decision, it is not clear whether patent owners will be
entitled to any presumption that they have been irreparably harmed when
attempting to preliminarily or permanently enjoin an infringer.
1.

Preliminary Injunctions

In the context of preliminary injunctions, the Federal Circuit has
consistently held that once a patent owner has demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits (by clearly establishing both validity and
infringement), irreparable harm will be presumed.223 Since eBay, the district
courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to whether the presumption of
irreparable harm continues to apply in the context of preliminary injunctions.
Some courts have concluded that the presumption has survived,224 some have
concluded that applying the presumption would be inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay,225 and some have taken a middle ground
with the perplexing conclusion that eBay “limited” the presumption.226 The
Federal Circuit has not yet resolved this issue.
In one post-eBay case, Abbot Laboratories v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit noted that the district court had applied a presumption of
irreparable harm after finding that the patentee had established a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits.227 The Federal Circuit held that the district
court had erred in finding that the patent owner had established a likelihood of
success on the merits, and therefore, the patent owner was “no longer entitled

223. E.g., Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see
supra Part I.C.2.
224. Pass & Seymour, Inc. v. Hubbell Inc., No. 5:07-CV-0272, 2007 WL 2172648, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007) (citing eBay for the proposition that the traditional equitable standards
apply with equal force to patent infringement cases, but asserting that in the preliminary
injunction context, “the law presumes the existence of . . . irreparable injury when a strong
showing of likelihood of success on the merits has been made”); Christiana Indus. v. Empire
Elecs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 870, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (holding that the eBay decision did not
invalidate the presumption of irreparable harm).
225. Sun Optics, Inc. v. FGX Int’l, Inc., Civ. No. 07-137-SLR, 2007 WL 2228569, at *1 (D.
Del. Aug. 2, 2007) (noting that the idea that there is a presumption of irreparable harm “seems
inconsistent with” the Supreme Court’s holding in eBay and holding that the moving party thus
has the burden of establishing that monetary damages will not suffice); Torpso Hockey Int’l, Inc.
v. Kor Hockey Ltd., 491 F. Supp. 2d 871, 881 (D. Minn. 2007) (concluding that in light of eBay,
a court cannot presume that a patentee who is likely to succeed on the merits at trial will suffer
irreparable harm).
226. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1017751, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 30, 2007) (noting that the eBay decision “has been read to limit the presumption of
irreparable harm”).
227. 452 F.3d 1331, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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to a presumption of irreparable harm.”228 Similarly, in PHG Technologies,
L.L.C. v. St. John Companies, Inc., the Federal Circuit noted that the district
court had applied a presumption of irreparable harm.229 However, the court
again held that the district court had erred in finding that the plaintiff had
established a reasonable likelihood of success and did not comment on the
continuing validity of the presumption.230 Thus, Abbot Laboratories and PHG
Technologies seemed to indicate that the Federal Circuit was operating under
the assumption that the presumption of irreparable harm would continue to
apply with respect to preliminary injunctions.
However, a subsequent Federal Circuit decision indicates that the
continuing validity of the presumption in the preliminary injunction context is
not so well-settled. In Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., the Federal Circuit
noted that the district court had applied a presumption of irreparable harm in
deciding to grant a preliminary injunction.231 The defendant argued that
applying such a presumption would be in direct contravention of the Supreme
Court’s holding in eBay.232 The Federal Circuit declined to address this
contention because it found that the patent owner had established that it would
be irreparably harmed in several specific ways, thus obviating any need to
apply the presumption.233 Thus, the Federal Circuit has left open the
possibility that the presumption will not continue to apply, even in the
preliminary injunction context.
2.

Permanent Injunctions

It is even less clear whether the presumption of irreparable harm will now
apply with respect to permanent injunctions. Prior to the eBay decision, there
was generally no need for courts to consider this issue, because the courts
simply applied the Federal Circuit’s general rule that absent exceptional
circumstances, an injunction would be granted.234 Nonetheless, at least two
district courts, including the district court in the eBay case, had applied a
presumption of irreparable harm in the permanent injunction context.235

228. Id. at 1347; see also Docusign, Inc. v. Sertifi, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1309–10 & n.6
(W.D. Wash. 2006) (holding that since the patent holder had not made a strong showing of likely
success on the merits, it was therefore not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm, and
noting that in Abbott, the Federal Circuit had assumed, without deciding, that “such a
presumption was still appropriate in the preliminary injunction context”).
229. 469 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
230. Id. at 1369.
231. 470 F.3d 1368, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
232. Id. at 1383 n.9.
233. Id.
234. Stockwell, supra note 11, at 749; see infra Part I.C.1.
235. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 711 (E.D. Va. 2003);
Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701–03
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Furthermore, in affirming the district court’s decision to grant a permanent
injunction in Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech Corp., the Federal Circuit made no
mention of the district court’s application of the presumption.236 Similarly, in
the eBay case itself, neither the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme Court took
note of the fact that the district court had applied a presumption of irreparable
harm in its initial decision.237 While certainly not conclusive, this leaves open
the possibility that the presumption may be applicable in the permanent
injunction context.
Confirming this possibility, in a case appealed to the Federal Circuit
following the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, the Federal Circuit indicated
that the issue of whether the presumption of irreparable harm applies in the
permanent injunction context is not settled.238 In International Rectifier Corp.
v. Ixys Corp., the district court granted a permanent injunction and the
adjudicated infringer moved for a stay of the injunction, pending appeal.239
The district court held that once infringement and validity have been
established, irreparable harm is presumed.240 The Federal Circuit remanded
the case, stating that “[t]he district court’s holding . . . may need to be revisited
in light of eBay.”241
Since eBay, the district courts have squarely addressed this issue on at least
four occasions when denying permanent injunctive relief, and have read the
eBay decision as abolishing the presumption.242 For example, on remand in
the eBay case, the district court held that the presumption no longer exists.243
Likewise, in z4 Technologies v. Microsoft Corp., the court observed that the
(D.N.J. 2000); Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(quoting Smith Int’l Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983)), aff’d, 185 F.3d
1259 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
236. See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
237. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); MercExchange, L.L.C. v.
eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
238. See Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. Ixys Corp., 188 F. App’x 1001, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(discussed supra, Part II.E); Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *5
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006) (denying injunctive relief and stating that the patentee’s argument that
irreparable harm is presumed whenever validity and continuing infringement have been
established “runs afoul of the court’s reasoning in eBay where the Court clearly held the right to
exclude does not, standing alone, justify a general rule in favor of injunctive relief”); Paice LLC
v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16,
2006) (denying injunctive relief and stating that, “The eBay decision demonstrates that no
presumption of irreparable harm should automatically follow from a finding of infringement.”);
z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (reasoning
that the language of eBay does not imply a presumption and denying injunctive relief).
243. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E.D. Va. 2007).
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plaintiff was unable to cite to any Supreme Court or Federal Circuit case
requiring the application of a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm with
respect to a permanent injunction.244 The court also reasoned that the language
of the eBay decision (“a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must . . .
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury . . . .”) does not imply
a presumption but rather places the burden of proving an irreparable injury on
the plaintiff.245 Thus, the court concluded that the presumption of irreparable
harm was not applicable.246
Similarly, in IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC, a case in which the court
chose to give the patentee more time in which to provide further evidence of
irreparable harm rather than denying permanent injunctive relief immediately,
the court simply assumed that the presumption no longer applied, without
discussing the issue at all.247
When granting permanent injunctions after eBay, the district courts have
not addressed the issue of whether a presumption of irreparable harm applies.
Instead, the courts have found irreparable harm based on, for example, loss of
market share and a resulting loss of profits and brand name recognition,248
harm to reputation resulting from confusion between products coupled with
loss of market share,249 harm to the patentee’s reputation for innovation
coupled with market share,250 or loss of market share coupled with price
erosion.251 Other courts have recited the four-factor eBay test but have not
explicitly addressed the irreparable harm factor; instead they have simply
noted that monetary damages are generally not an adequate remedy for future
infringement because the principal value of a patent is the right to exclude.252

244. z4 Technologies, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 440.
245. Id. (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
246. Id.
247. 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 224, 226 (D. Del. 2007) (referring to “the now-overturned
presumption that a patent holder is irreparably harmed upon a finding of infringement”).
248. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 983 (W.D. Tenn.
2006).
249. Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3446144, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006).
250. Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., Inc., No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006 WL 2128851, at *5
(W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006).
251. Tivo Inc. v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 667, 669–670 (E.D. Tex.
2006).
252. Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748 (FJS/GJD), 2006 WL 2385425, at
*1–2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006); see also 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp.,
No. 01-1781 (JRT/FLN), 2006 WL 2735499, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006) (stating that where
the patentee had spent five years litigating to protect its interest in the patent and had consistently
refused to execute a licensing agreement with the infringer, the court would not disturb the
patentee’s determination that its business interests would not be best served by licensing the
product and noting that in patent infringement cases, where the infringing device will continue to
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In sum, the district courts are in need of guidance as to the continuing
validity of the presumption of irreparable harm in the post-eBay era. The
Federal Circuit, with its breadth and depth of knowledge in the area of patent
disputes, is in an excellent position to provide such guidance. In resolving this
issue, the Federal Circuit could choose one of several alternative approaches:
(1) maintain the presumption of irreparable harm with respect to preliminary
injunctions but decline to impose such a presumption in the context of
permanent injunctions; (2) eliminate the presumption entirely with respect to
both types of injunction; or (3) apply a presumption of irreparable harm to both
types of injunction.
It makes little sense to apply a presumption of irreparable harm in the
context of preliminary injunctions but not in the context of permanent
injunctions. Many courts, including the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, have observed that a preliminary injunction is a “drastic and
extraordinary remedy that is not to be routinely granted.”253 On the other hand,
courts have recognized, both before and after the eBay decision, that the right
to permanent injunctive relief is an essential part of the patent system and thus
such relief will be appropriate in many cases once a patent has been finally
determined to be both valid and infringed.254 It could be argued that a
defendant who is permanently enjoined will be more severely harmed than a
defendant who is enjoined preliminarily, since the former will be barred from
practicing the patented invention until the patent expires, whereas the latter
might be able to resume his activities much sooner if the court ultimately finds
that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. But preliminary
injunctions can have profound effects on the defendant in a patent infringement

infringe and thus damage the patentee in the future, monetary damages are generally considered
to be inadequate).
253. E.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian
Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995
F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993); cf. Polymer Technologies, Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 977
(“[S]tatements that a preliminary injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy do not imply
that it must be rare or practically unattainable, only that it is not to be granted as a matter of right;
it must be thoroughly justified.”).
254. See Telequip, 2006 WL 2385425, at *2 (“[W]ithout the right to obtain an injunction, the
right to exclude granted to the patentee would have only a fraction of the value it was intended to
have, and would no longer be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and
technological research.”). Similar language appears in Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718
F.2d 1573, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that courts have long granted permanent injunctive
relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases, and while this historical
practice does not justify a general rule in favor of granting injunctions, “a page of history is worth
a volume of logic”).
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suit.255
Specifically, many defendants have argued—and courts have
acknowledged—that a preliminary injunction will put them out of business.256
Furthermore, by definition, preliminary injunctions are granted prior to a full
hearing on the merits.257 Thus, if the patentee’s burden of showing irreparable
harm is decreased by applying a presumption in the preliminary injunction
context, it would be illogical for courts to decline to apply such a presumption
with respect to permanent injunctions.
For the reasons outlined below, the Federal Circuit should maintain the
status quo with respect to preliminary injunctions and clarify that a
presumption of irreparable harm also applies in the context of permanent
injunctions.
B.

Applying a Rebuttable Presumption of Irreparable Harm Would Not be
Inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s Decision in eBay

The eBay decision can be read as suggesting that a rebuttable presumption
of irreparable harm should apply in determinations of whether to grant
injunctive relief. Although some language in the majority opinion indicates
that the patentee must bear the full burden of proving irreparable harm,258 the
concurrences, in which a total of seven Justices joined (out of the eight who
participated in the decision), indicate that these justices are of the view that
injunctive relief will continue to be appropriate in most cases.259
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence stressed that courts should use history
as a guide in applying the four-factor equitable test.260 The Chief Justice noted
that since at least the nineteenth century, courts have granted injunctive relief
upon a finding of infringement in the “vast majority of patent cases,” and that
this practice was not surprising given the difficulty of protecting a right to
exclude through monetary remedies that permit use of the patented invention
255. E.g., Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 708 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (noting that the fact that the defendant was a small company and could be put out of
business by the issuance of a preliminary injunction did not insulate it from the issuance of a
preliminary injunction).
256. See id.; Docusign, Inc. v. Sertifi, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1310–11 (W.D. Wash.
2006) (concluding that issuing a preliminary injunction would harm the public interest by putting
the defendant out of business without a strong showing of necessity); see also TCPIP Holding Co.
v. Haar Commc’ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 102–03 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (trademark infringement case
stating that a preliminary injunction can have drastic consequences in that it may put a party out
of business prior to trial on the merits).
257. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 800 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
“preliminary injunction” as “A temporary injunction issued before or during trial to prevent an
irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a chance to decide the case”).
258. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury . . . .” (emphasis added)).
259. See id. at 394–97 (Roberts, C.J., concurring and Kennedy, J., concurring).
260. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see supra Part II.D.2.
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against a patentee’s wishes.261 While agreeing with the majority that the
historical practice of frequently granting injunctions does not entitle a patentee
to a permanent injunction in all cases or justify a general rule in favor of
injunctive relief, the Chief Justice stressed that “there is a difference between
exercising equitable discretion . . . and writing on an entirely clean slate.”262
Chief Justice Roberts further cautioned that “[d]iscretion is not a whim, and
limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic
principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike.”263 Finally, the
Chief Justice quoted Justice Holmes for the proposition that “a page of history
is worth a volume of logic.”264
Justice Kennedy agreed with the Chief Justice that “history may be
instructive” in applying the four-factor test.265 However, Justice Kennedy
stressed that the lesson of the historical practice of granting injunctions in the
vast majority of cases is “most helpful and instructive when the circumstances
of a case bear substantial parallels to litigation the courts have confronted
before.”266 Justice Kennedy was concerned that some modern patent
infringement cases are quite different from those that the courts have
encountered in the past, in that the patented invention may be “but a small
component of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an
injunction [may be] employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations . . . .”267
Considered together, the concurrences suggest that a majority of the
Justices thought that the practice of granting injunctions in most cases where
validity and infringement have been established should not be disturbed, at
least in those cases which bear a substantial resemblance to the types of cases
the courts have previously encountered. This indicates that the application of a
presumption of irreparable harm, which might be rebuttable in the “patent
holdup” situations that concerned Justice Kennedy,268 would not be
objectionable to at least the seven Justices who joined in the concurrences.
Applying such a presumption would promote consistency in the
application of the equitable factors by the district courts and thereby help to
preserve the bargaining power of patentees who are not using the threat of an
injunction “simply for undue leverage in negotiations.”269 Moreover, applying
the presumption would still permit district courts to exercise their discretion,
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
eBay, 547 U.S. at 395–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra Part II.D.3.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
See supra Part II.D.3; infra Part III.E.
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in eBay, because the presumption
would be rebuttable and could be outweighed by one or more of the other
equitable factors.
Furthermore, while criticizing other aspects of the district court’s decision,
the majority in eBay did not explicitly reject the district court’s approach in
presuming irreparable harm once it found that validity and infringement had
been clearly established.270 Similarly, neither of the concurring Justices
commented on this issue.271 This may have been an oversight, or the Court
may have simply chosen to focus on the larger issue of the Federal Circuit’s
general rule in favor of injunctive relief. However, one would expect that if
the Court had a strong inclination that a presumption of irreparable harm
should not apply, this would have been explicitly noted in the opinion.
In addition to the inferences that can be drawn from a careful reading of
the eBay decision itself, there are several other sound reasons why a rebuttable
presumption of irreparable harm should be applied in patent disputes. One
such reason is that the underlying justification for applying such a presumption
has not changed as a result of the Court’s decision in eBay.
C. Courts Should Apply a Rebuttable Presumption of Irreparable Harm
Because the Underlying Justifications for Granting Injunctive Relief in the
Vast Majority of Patent Infringement Cases Are Not Changed by the eBay
Decision
The courts have long recognized that “the right to exclude recognized in a
patent is but the essence of the concept of property.”272 This fundamental
notion was not changed by the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay. Although
both the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence emphasized that
“the existence of a right to exclude does not dictate the remedy for a violation
of that right,”273 this should not be interpreted as a rejection of the notion that
the injunctive relief is ordinarily the appropriate remedy for a violation of a
right to exclude. Rather, these statements should be viewed simply as a
recognition of the fact that in limited circumstances, imposing a permanent
injunction would be inequitable.

270. See id. at 390–95 (majority opinion); MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp.
2d 695, 711–12 (E.D. Va. 2003).
271. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394–97 (Roberts, C.J., concurring and Kennedy, J., concurring).
272. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (characterizing the view that
“the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented
invention” as “long-settled”) (citing Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405,
424–25 (1908); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969)).
273. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392, 396 (majority opinion and Kennedy, J., concurring).
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In his concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts recognized that the long tradition
of granting injunctive relief in the vast majority of cases was “not surprising,
given the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies
that allow an infringer to use an invention against the patentee’s wishes.”274
Since eBay, many district courts have continued to stress this fundamental
concept. For example, in Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., the court noted
that “the principal value of a patent is its statutory right to exclude.”275 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit unsurprisingly did not question this assertion.276
Similarly, in Telequip Corp. v. The Change Exchange, the court asserted that
“without the right to obtain an injunction, the right to exclude granted to the
patentee would have only a fraction of the value it was intended to have, and
would no longer be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and
technological research.”277 Other district courts have made similar contentions
in the post-eBay era.278
Both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have long recognized that
in the majority of cases, money damages are not an adequate remedy and
injunctive relief will be appropriate.279 In the words of Justice McKenna,
writing for the Court in Continental Paper Bag:
From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his
remedies. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its
attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its violation. Anything but
prevention takes away the privilege which the law confers upon the
280
patentee.

eBay did not purport to reject Continental Paper Bag.281 Thus, it seems
appropriate to apply a rebuttable presumption that the patent owner will be
irreparably harmed in the absence of injunctive relief, thereby placing the
burden on the adjudicated infringer to prove otherwise.
274. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
275. 488 F. Supp. 2d 317, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
276. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
277. No. 5:01-CV-1748 (FJS/GJD), 2006 WL 2385425, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006).
278. E.g., Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL
3446144, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006) (“[T]he principal value of a patent is its statutory right to
exclude.”); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 984 (W.D. Tenn.
2006) (“[T]he central value of holding a patent is the right to exclude others from using the
patented product.”).
279. See, e.g., Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(“Because the principal value of a patent is its statutory right to exclude, the nature of the patent
grant weighs against holding that monetary damages will always suffice to make the patentee
whole.”).
280. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 430 (1908).
281. In fact, the Court relied on Continental Paper Bag for the proposition that courts may
grant injunctive relief to a patent holder who has unreasonably declined to use the patent. eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
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It could be argued that the right to exclude conferred by the patent statute
could be protected effectively by imposing a compulsory license with a high
royalty rate. Imposing high royalties would be consistent with the statutory
language, which provides that courts “shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty . . . .” and “[i]n either event the court may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”282 This language
does not prohibit a court from imposing an unreasonable royalty (i.e., a royalty
higher than that to which the parties would agree on their own or that a court
would impose when imagining licensing negotiations between a willing
licensor and licensee), and such a remedy might be appropriate under some
circumstances. However, if a court were to impose a royalty so high that it
would effectively exclude the infringer from practicing the patented invention
by making it economically infeasible or impossible to do so, this would have
essentially the same effect as granting injunctive relief.
Finally, in the preliminary injunction context, the Federal Circuit has noted
that one justification for the presumption of irreparable harm stems from the
fact that the patent grant has a finite term, and the passage of time can work
irremediable harm.283 The eBay decision did not change the finite nature of the
patent term, and thus this justification for the presumption remains intact as
well.
D. Applying a Rebuttable Presumption of Irreparable Harm Would Promote
Certainty and Preserve the Patent Owner’s Bargaining Power, at Least in
a Substantial Subset of Patent Infringement Cases
As evidenced by the varying approaches taken by the district courts thus
far, the eBay decision has generated much uncertainty as to when injunctive
relief will be available to a patentee.284 Furthermore, although injunctive relief
has been granted in the majority of reported cases decided since eBay, several
courts have denied injunctive relief in circumstances under which such relief
likely would have been granted prior to eBay.285

282. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
283. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
284. See supra Part III.A.
285. For example, in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., the court denied injunctive relief
based on findings that the patent owner had not been irreparably harmed and that monetary
damages would provide sufficient compensation, reasoning that the infringing product made up
only a small component of the infringing vehicles and the patent owner had been willing to
license its technology to the infringer. No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006). The court also found that the third factor of the equitable test—the balance
of hardships between the parties—weighed in favor of the adjudicated infringer, because
enjoining the infringer’s sales would likely interrupt the infringer’s business as well as that of
related businesses, and would damage the infringer’s reputation. Id. at *6. On appeal, the
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Such uncertainty, coupled with the potentially decreased availability of
injunctive relief, decreases the patentee’s bargaining power.286 If the parties to
a licensing negotiation are uncertain whether, given a particular set of
circumstances, injunctive relief would likely be available should the potential
licensee engage in infringing activity, the potential licensee will have less of an
incentive to enter into a licensing agreement or to do so on terms that are fair
to the patent owner. In a case where the potential licensee stands to benefit
greatly from practicing the patented invention and thinks that there is a
reasonable chance that its activity would not be enjoined by a court, the
rational choice might be to go ahead and engage in the infringing activity.
This would be especially true where the potential licensee believes that any
damages it would be ordered to pay by the court would be equal to or less than
the compensation requested by the patent owner.
This problem would be exacerbated in a situation where the patent owner
is an individual inventor or a small company, who may already be at a
disadvantage in negotiations with a much larger entity. As noted by Professors
Epstein, Wagner, and Kieff, “The supposed ‘patent troll’ may actually be a
small entrepreneur trying desperately to negotiate with large infringers.”287
Without the threat of a permanent injunction, the inventor of a small but truly
innovative component that a large company wishes to use in its product will
have little chance of negotiating a fair licensing agreement.
A similar problem was described by the Sixth Circuit in Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works, Inc.288 In Panduit, the court criticized the
practice of determining a reasonable royalty rate by imagining a hypothetical
negotiation between a willing patent owner and a willing licensee.289 The
court noted that
[This] would . . . make an election to infringe a handy means for
competitors to impose a “compulsory license” policy upon every patent owner.

Federal Circuit asserted that in certain cases, imposing an ongoing royalty instead of injunctive
relief may be appropriate, but criticized the district court for not providing any reasoning its
support its selection of a royalty rate of twenty-five dollars per infringing vehicle. Paice LLC v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (2007). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit remanded the
case to the district court for a reevaluation of the royalty rate. Id. at 1315. The district courts
have denied permanent injunctive relief in at least six other cases thus far. See supra note 8.
286. Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 27–28, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130)
(arguing that the Federal Circuit’s general rule should not be upset because “the use of a
permanent injunction may facilitate cooperative bargaining, not frustrate it, forcing outsiders to
license technologies they wish to use. Awarding the permanent injunction allows agreement on
terms acceptable to the patentee, which has the salutary effect of forcing an actual or would-be
infringer to the bargaining table.” (internal citation omitted)).
287. Id. at 28.
288. 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978).
289. Id.
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Except for the limited risk that the patent owner, over years of litigation,
might meet the heavy burden of proving . . . lost profits, the infringer would
have nothing to lose, and everything to gain if he could count on paying only
the normal, routine royalty non-infringers might have paid. As said by this
court in another context, the infringer would be in a “heads-I-win, tails-you290
lose” position.

In other words, to deter infringement, there must be some punitive element
(and preferably a severe one) associated with engaging in infringing activity.
Where a would-be infringer faces a choice between negotiating with the patent
owner at the outset for a license or simply engaging in the potentially
infringing activity, he may well choose the latter if he thinks that there is a fair
chance that a court would impose only a reasonable royalty as damages. This
could be the case, for example, where the circumstances make it unlikely that
the patent owner would be able to prove lost profits.
The availability of enhanced damages for willful infringement or the
possibility that a court could impose a very high royalty rate291 might serve this
punitive function in some cases and thus deter some would-be infringers.
However, the threat of enhanced damages or a high royalty rate would likely
not be enough to deter infringing activity in all cases, especially where
engaging in the infringing activity is expected to be highly profitable.
In sum, decreased availability of injunctive relief and uncertainty as to the
circumstances under which injunctive relief will be available places the
infringer in a “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose” situation. Applying a presumption
of irreparable harm when patent validity and infringement have been
established would help to counteract this problem by promoting certainty in a
significant subset of cases.
One notable exception is that application of a presumption of irreparable
harm might not promote certainty in those cases that closely resemble the
“patent holdup” situation that concerned Justice Kennedy.292 In at least some
such cases, the presumption of irreparable harm could be rebutted, and courts
would need to examine carefully whether the patented invention was truly a
small or insignificant component of the infringing product, and whether the
patent owner was truly attempting to extract disproportionate value from the
infringer. 293 However, many patent infringement cases will not fall into this
category, but rather will “bear substantial parallels to litigation the courts have
290. Id. (quoting Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir.
1972)). Courts have noted that referring to such hypothetical negotiations as “willing
licensor/willing licensee” negotiations is an “absurd” characterization “when . . . the patentee
does not wish to grant a license.” Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 n.13
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
291. See supra Part III.C.
292. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
293. See infra Part III.E.
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confronted before.”294 In these cases, applying a presumption of irreparable
harm would act as a check on the district courts to ensure that injunctive relief
is not denied in an inconsistent or haphazard fashion. Such an approach would
be consistent with Chief Justice Roberts’s warning that “limiting discretion
according to legal standards helps promote the basic principle of justice that
like cases should be decided alike,” and Justice Kennedy’s observation that the
“historical practice [of issuing injunctions against patent infringers] . . . is most
helpful and instructive when the circumstances of a case bear substantial
parallels to litigation the courts have confronted before.”295
A presumption of irreparable harm and the increased certainty that would
follow therefrom would have benefits beyond preserving the patent owner’s
bargaining power. For example, certainty as to the circumstances under which
injunctive relief is likely to be granted would encourage private resolution of
patent disputes through licensing agreements and settlement of many disputes
in the early stages of litigation.296 Voluntary licensing agreements are
desirable, not only because they avoid litigation, but also because they give the
patent owner an opportunity to include commercial business terms in the
agreement which can help the patent owner to maintain control over its
invention or limit encroachment on its market share.297
While applying a presumption of irreparable harm would promote certainty
in many cases, it would not be tantamount to reinstating the Federal Circuit’s
general rule in favor of granting injunctions. The infringer would have an
opportunity to rebut the presumption, and courts would be required to weigh
the other equitable factors as well.
E.

The Presumption of Irreparable Harm Would Be a Rebuttable
Presumption and the Irreparable Harm Factor Could Be Outweighed by
Other Equitable Factors in Some Circumstances

A presumption of irreparable harm differs significantly from the Federal
Circuit’s general rule that injunctive relief should nearly always be granted.
First, the presumption would be rebuttable, and in light of the eBay decision,
courts will be more likely take the infringer’s rebuttal arguments seriously.298
Second, a showing of irreparable harm is only one of the four factors the courts

294. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
295. See id. at 395–96 (Roberts, C.J., concurring and Kennedy, J., concurring).
296. Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 23–24, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130)
(arguing that the Federal Circuit’s general rule of granting injunctive relief should be maintained).
297. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-032910, 2006 WL 3813778, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
298. Stockwell, supra note 11, at 751.
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are required to examine under eBay.299 In some circumstances, even where the
court has concluded that the patent owner will be irreparably harmed in the
absence of injunctive relief, the irreparable harm factor might still be
outweighed by one or more of the other equitable considerations. Finally,
when a court finds that the infringer has rebutted the presumption of
irreparable harm, that the other equitable factors weigh against a grant of
injunctive relief, or both, courts should consider alternatives to an absolute
denial of a permanent injunction.
1.

Rebuttal of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm

An infringer could rebut the presumption of irreparable harm in a number
of different ways. However, to promote uniformity among the district courts,
it would be useful for the Federal Circuit to establish some general guidelines
as to the circumstances under which the presumption would ordinarily be
rebutted, or ordinarily not be rebutted.
The Federal Circuit’s prior decisions with respect to the presumption of
irreparable harm as it has been applied in the context of preliminary
injunctions provide some guidance. First, the Federal Circuit has indicated that
a finding that future infringement is no longer likely may be sufficient to rebut
the presumption of irreparable harm.300 However, the fact that the infringer
has stopped infringing should not be sufficient, by itself, to rebut the
presumption.301 In other words, a mere cessation of infringing activity is
generally not a sufficient reason for denying injunctive relief, unless the
evidence is “very persuasive that future infringement will not take place” (e.g.,
the infringer no longer has the manufacturing capacity to produce the
infringing product).302 Thus, very persuasive evidence that the infringement
will not continue could be sufficient to rebut the presumption of irreparable
harm.
Second, the Federal Circuit has noted that evidence that the patentee has
delayed bringing suit may be considered in determining whether the infringer
has rebutted the presumption of irreparable harm.303 This is a sensible
consideration. If a patent owner has unreasonably delayed in attempting to
enforce her patent rights, it is reasonable to infer that she probably has not been
irreparably harmed by the infringement.
Third, the Federal Circuit has indicated that a finding that the patentee was
willing to forgo its right to exclude by licensing the patent may be sufficient to

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281–82 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1282.
Polymer Techs., 103 F.3d at 975.
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rebut the presumption of irreparable harm.304 Similarly, the district court in
eBay, both in the first instance and on remand, considered evidence that the
patentee “does not practice its inventions and exists merely to license its
patented technology to others.”305 However, the Supreme Court rejected the
view that the patentee’s willingness to license its patents and lack of
commercial activity would automatically be sufficient justification for denying
injunctive relief.306 Rather, the Court noted:
[S]ome patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors,
might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than secure the
financing necessary to bring their works to market themselves. Such patent
holders may be able to satisfy the traditional four-factor test, and we see no
307
basis for categorically denying them the opportunity to do so.

This statement implies that it would not be reasonable for other patent owners,
who are not “university researchers” or “self-made inventors” to follow a
business model that involves licensing, rather than practicing the patented
invention. The Court’s underlying concern here was likely with patent trolls,
the patent holdup problem, or both.308 However, a patentee’s willingness to
license and failure to practice the patented invention, considered alone, are
inappropriate considerations in determining whether the presumption of
irreparable harm has been rebutted. As Professors Epstein, Wagner, and Kieff
have explained, as a policy matter, the courts should not be evaluating the
appropriateness of patent owners’ business models.309 Furthermore, many
patentees have business models centered around their expertise in inventing
and developing technologies, but not manufacturing them.310 Or, a company
may have exited a line of business, yet still own a patent portfolio related to
that business.311 Moreover, determining who is a “self-made inventor” who
may reasonably license his patented invention and who is a “patent troll” may

304. Id.
305. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003);
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 571 (E.D. Va. 2007).
306. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
307. Id.
308. See supra Part I.D. Justice Kennedy more explicitly raised this concern in his
concurrence, noting:
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees . . . . For these firms,
an injunction . . . can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
309. Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 27, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130).
310. Id.
311. Id.
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not always be straightforward.312 Finally, under Continental Paper Bag, which
the Court did not purport to overrule in eBay, a patentee is not required to
practice the patented invention to be entitled to injunctive relief.313 Thus, the
mere fact that a patent owner licenses or wishes to license her invention and
does not practice the invention herself should not by itself be sufficient to rebut
the presumption of irreparable harm.
However, when considered in
conjunction with other circumstances, such as where the invention is a very
small or insignificant component of the infringing device or system and the
patent owner has attempted to extract disproportionate value for the invention
from an infringer, the licensing practices of the patentee may have some
relevance to the determination of whether the presumption has been rebutted.
However, courts should exercise extreme caution in concluding that the
presumption has been rebutted for these reasons.
In addition to the above factors set forth by the Federal Circuit in the
context of preliminary injunctions prior to the eBay case, other circumstances
may also be sufficient to rebut the presumption of irreparable harm. For
example, in eBay, the district court considered the fact that the patent owner
had made numerous comments to the media before, during, and after trial
indicating that it did not seek to enjoin eBay but rather only sought appropriate
damages for the infringement.314 Under such circumstances, it may be
appropriate for a court to conclude that the patentee is estopped from arguing
that it will be irreparably harmed in the absence of injunctive relief.
As another example, in Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., the parties had
entered into a settlement agreement which included a provision capping any
damages for infringement.315 The infringer argued that this provision was an
admission by the patent owner that it would not be irreparably harmed in the
absence of a preliminary injunction.316 The Federal Circuit rejected this
argument, but did so because the agreement also contemplated that an
injunction could issue.317 Thus, if the parties to a patent dispute had a similar
agreement which did not contemplate the possibility of an injunction, this
might be sufficient to rebut the presumption of irreparable harm.
There are undoubtedly other circumstances in which it would be
appropriate for a court to find that the presumption of irreparable harm had
been rebutted. The above list is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather is
intended to illustrate some circumstances in which a finding of rebuttal may be

312. See id. at 28 (“The supposed ‘patent troll’ may actually be a small entrepreneur trying
desperately to negotiate with large infringers.”).
313. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424–25 (1908).
314. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003).
315. 470 F.3d 1368, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1381–82.
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appropriate. However, even when a court has decided that the infringer has not
sufficiently rebutted the presumption of irreparable harm or when the court has
determined that the patentee has proven irreparable harm, the court may still
deny injunctive relief if it concludes that irreparable harm factor is outweighed
by one of the other three equitable considerations.
2.

Situations in Which the Irreparable Harm Factor May be Outweighed
by Other Equitable Considerations

Under some circumstances, the irreparable harm factor of the traditional
equitable test will be outweighed by one or more of the three other equitable
factors: the public interest, the balance of the hardships, and whether the
patentee has an adequate remedy at law.318 As will be seen from the following
discussion, courts should focus primarily on the public interest and balance of
the hardships factors in making this determination.
a.

The Public Interest

Prior to eBay, in the few instances in which courts denied injunctive relief
in a patent infringement case, they did so based primarily on public interest
considerations. Such denials of injunctive relief will continue to be
appropriate in the post-eBay era, but such denials should be limited to
situations in which the public interest would be gravely harmed by an
injunction. Injunctive relief should not be denied simply because the public
would be moderately inconvenienced by an injunction.
For example, the courts have long recognized that where enjoining the
infringing activity would pose a serious threat to public health, injunctive relief
should be denied.319 Similarly, if enjoining the infringing activity would pose
a serious threat of harm to the environment, it may be appropriate for a court to
determine that the irreparable harm factor is outweighed by the public interest
factor. However, the fact that the patent claims a medical device is not itself,
without more, a sufficient reason to deny injunctive relief based on the public
interest.320
Some courts have suggested that inconvenience to the public may be
sufficient to tip the scales in favor of denying injunctive relief. For example,
318. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
319. City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934) (denying
injunctive relief where granting an injunction would require the closing of a sewage treatment
plant and the running of raw sewage into Lake Michigan).
320. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985 (W.D. Tenn. 2006)
(enjoining the defendant from infringing a patent on a medical product where the record did not
indicate an “enormous public reliance” on the defendant’s product and where other similar
products were available to consumers; rejecting the defendant’s argument that there was a
substantial public interest in having access to its products, which it alleged were safer and more
effective).
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in Nerney v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., the Second Circuit denied injunctive
relief where granting such relief would have caused a great inconvenience to
the public by slowing down train schedules.321 More recently, in the wake of
the Court’s decision in eBay, several courts have either noted that
inconvenience to the public is an appropriate consideration or have actually
considered this factor in denying injunctive relief.322 However, courts should
exercise caution in basing a denial of injunctive relief on inconvenience to the
public, and should do so only where the inconvenience is extreme. For
instance, a denial of injunctive relief on the basis of public inconvenience
might be appropriate where a substantial number of businesses would be
unable to function if access to the infringing product or service were suddenly
withdrawn, or where a widely used public service would be disrupted by a
grant of injunctive relief.
Finally, when considering whether granting injunctive relief would be
consistent with the public interest, courts should bear in mind that the public
has a strong interest in enforcement of patent rights and protecting the integrity
of the patent system, as recognized by many courts both prior to and since the
eBay decision.323 This consideration may be entitled to less weight when
public health or safety is at stake, and more weight when the threat to the
public interest is simply an inconvenience of some form.
b.

Balance of the Hardships

Instances in which the balance of the hardships would tip so strongly in
favor of an infringer as to justify a denial of injunctive relief will likely be rare.
An infringer, by definition, is violating the rights of another, and therefore
even substantial harm to an infringer should ordinarily not be enough to tip the
balance of the hardships in the infringer’s favor. The infringing party will
nearly always be harmed or inconvenienced in some way by being enjoined
from practicing the patented invention.
In Windsurfing International, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., the Federal Circuit held
that the fact that the infringing product was the defendant’s primary product

321. 83 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1936).
322. Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., No. CV-96-5658, 2006 WL 2844400, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2006) (suggesting that inconvenience to the public is an appropriate factor to consider,
but finding that the public would not be inconvenienced under the circumstances of the case); z4
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443–44 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (denying
injunctive relief where public had an “enormous reliance” on the infringing software product and
where imposing the injunction would likely result in pirated software being introduced into the
market).
323. Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Ill. Tool Works,
Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 2006 WL 3813778, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Dec.
27, 2006).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1032

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:985

and thus imposing an injunction might put the defendant out of business was
not a sufficient reason to deny injunctive relief.324 On the other hand, in
Nerney, the court considered inconvenience to the infringing party in denying
injunctive relief, along with inconvenience to the public and other factors.325
Although Windsurfing and Nerney both predate eBay, courts should follow the
lead of these cases and deny injunctive relief on the basis of a hardship to the
infringing party only where the hardship would be extremely severe in
comparison to the hardship to the patentee or where one or more of the other
equitable factors also tip the scales in favor of denying injunctive relief.
c.

Adequacy of the Patentee’s Remedy at Law

The question of whether remedies available at law are adequate to
compensate the patentee is closely intertwined with the question of whether the
patentee will be irreparably harmed in the absence of injunctive relief.326 As
the Second Circuit has explained, “If an injury can be appropriately
compensated by an award of monetary damages, then an adequate remedy at
law exists and no irreparable injury may be found to justify specific relief.
But, irreparable harm may be found where damages are difficult to establish
and measure.”327 Thus, many of the same considerations that will be relevant
to determining whether the presumption of irreparable harm has been rebutted
will also be relevant to determining whether the patentee has an adequate
remedy at law. Generally speaking, the two inquiries are one and the same.
Furthermore, whether the patentee has an adequate remedy at law is a
binary inquiry—money damages will either adequately compensate the
patentee, or they will not. There is not much middle ground. The public
interest and balance of the hardship factors, on the other hand, require more
graduated inquiries: one must consider how much the public interest would be
harmed by an injunction, how much the infringer would be harmed by an
injunction, and how much the patentee would be harmed in the absence of an
injunction.
Thus, it makes little sense to ask whether the irreparable harm factor is
outweighed by the adequacy of remedies at law factor. Rather, in determining
whether the irreparable harm factor has been outweighed by another equitable
consideration, the courts should focus on the public interest and balance of the
hardships prongs.

324.
325.
326.
327.

782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Nerney v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 83 F.2d 409, 410–11 (2d Cir. 1936).
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582 (E.D. Va. 2007).
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004).
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Courts Should Consider Alternatives to an Absolute Denial of
Injunctive Relief

When a court finds that the infringer has rebutted the presumption of
irreparable harm, that the remaining equitable factors weigh against granting
injunctive relief, or both, it still may not always be appropriate for the court to
deny injunctive relief altogether and thus grant a de facto compulsory license
to the infringer for the remainder of the patent term. Instead, courts should
consider whether a compromise approach, similar to that taken by the court in
Schneider (Europe) AG v. SciMed Life Systems, Inc., would be more
appropriate.328
The patent involved in Schneider claimed a catheter used to treat coronary
artery disease.329 Four surgeons testified that they preferred the infringing
device over other similar catheters and stated that a small percentage of
procedures could not be performed at all without using the infringing device.330
The court held that mere personal preference was not an adequate reason for
denying an injunction, but rather than immediately enjoining the defendant, the
court imposed a one-year “transition period to allow an efficient and nondisruptive changeover for those institutions and physicians who now employ
the [infringing catheter] exclusively.”331 The court also required the defendant
to pay the plaintiffs a fifteen percent royalty during the one-year transition
period.332
Thus, where imposing an injunction immediately would harm the public
interest, the court should consider whether it would be equitable to delay the
injunction so that alternative arrangements could be made to minimize the
burden on the public.
CONCLUSION
Factoring a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm into the equitable
balancing analysis that eBay requires of district courts would both preserve the
fundamental nature of the patent grant as a right to exclude and promote
predictability as to when injunctive relief is likely to be granted, at least with
respect to cases which bear a reasonable resemblance to the types of cases the
courts have long encountered. Availability of injunctive relief in the majority
of patent infringement cases and predictability about when such relief will and
will not be available are desirable because such circumstances would further
the goals underlying the patent system, largely by preserving the bargaining

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

852 F. Supp. 813 (D. Minn. 1994).
Id. at 824.
Id. at 850.
Id. at 861–62.
Id. at 862.
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power of the patentee. In particular, if parties cannot reliably predict when
injunctive relief will be available, would-be infringers will be less likely to
enter into licensing agreements with patent owners. Instead, infringers might
reasonably choose to continue to infringe, in the hopes that a patent owner
(especially a patent owner who is an individual inventor or small company)
might not have the resources to engage in drawn-out and costly litigation, or
that if litigation did ensue and proceeded to a final judgment, the court might
simply impose a compulsory license with a reasonable royalty instead of
granting an injunction. Such circumstances might well hamper an inventor’s
incentives to innovate and disclose new inventions to the public in a timely
manner. There might also be reduced incentives to design around patented
inventions, and thus expand the range of alternative products and services
available, because parties who wish to use the patented invention may think
that there is a fair chance that the consequence of infringing will be the
imposition of a requirement to pay a reasonable royalty, rather than an
injunction.
However, the Supreme Court was correct to recognize that in some
situations, a denial of injunctive relief will be appropriate. In addition to the
circumstances under which the courts have long denied such relief (e.g.,
serious threats to public health or safety), denials of injunctive relief might also
be appropriate in at least some patent holdup situations. When confronted with
such cases, the courts should carefully consider whether the patented invention
is truly a small or insignificant component of a multi-component product (as
opposed to a truly innovative or essential component) and whether the threat of
an injunction has truly been “employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations.”333 The courts will likely face difficult line-drawing problems in
this area: For example, at what point does a patented component of a larger
product become small or insignificant? And where is the line between
legitimate negotiating tactics and “undue leverage”? Such determinations will
likely need to be made on a case-by-case basis, in light of the totality of the
circumstances. However, applying a rebuttable presumption of irreparable
harm will help to keep the courts in check and prevent denials of injunctive
relief in situations where such a denial would be unjust.
The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
shifted the landscape of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases. While
the Court made clear that it was rejecting the Federal Circuit’s general rule
favoring injunctive relief, its decision left many questions unanswered. In
addition to the question of whether to apply a presumption of irreparable harm,
the courts will face other complex questions about how to best implement the
equitable balancing procedure. Among other issues, the courts will likely need

333. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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to address: (1) whether willfulness should be considered in the balancing
analysis; (2) how much weight, if any, should be given to a patent owner’s
willingness to license and failure to practice the patented invention; and (3)
where a de facto compulsory license is imposed following a denial of
injunctive relief, how the royalty rate should be determined. In answering
these questions, the courts should be mindful of this country’s long history of
protecting patent rights and of the goals that the patent system is designed to
promote.
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